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The year was 2000. The City of Los Angeles had discovered
widespread corruption in its police department. About seventy
officers were under investigation, and hundreds of convictions were
likely to be overturned because of official misconduct.1 Citizens
reading their newspapers must have wondered: “What can we do so
that these abuses will never happen again?”
And that question led to a more basic puzzle: Why had things
turned out so badly at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD),
in the first place?
“The lines between right and wrong became fuzzy and
indistinct,” former officer Rafael Perez explained at his sentencing
hearing.2 “The ‘us against them’ ethos of the overzealous cop began
to consume me.”3 With his voice quavering, Perez added:
To do our job fairly was not enough. My job became an intoxicant
that I lusted after. I can only say I succumbed to the seductress of
power. Used wrongfully, it is a power that can bend the will of a
man to satisfy a lustful moment. It can open locked vaults to
facilitate theft. It can even subvert justice to hand down a lifetime
behind bars.4

But even with all of his candor, Perez’s explanation remained
incomplete. His testimony did not shed any light upon the
mechanism by which he and his fellow officers were induced to
“succumb to the seductress of power.” It did not show how to
distinguish dangerous situations, in which bad behavior was likely to
develop, from cases in which officers did not abuse their authority.
Perez’s testimony also did not tell us how to minimize the likelihood
of similar misconduct in the future.

1. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Ex-Officer Gives Tearful Apology at His Sentencing,
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 26, 2000, at A2.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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I. FROM ABU GHRAIB PRISON TO ENRON CORPORATION
Obviously, the LAPD is not the only organization in which good
people sometimes go bad. At Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, American
jailers photographed each other committing acts of abuse against
detainees, thereby subjecting themselves to prosecution and losing
credibility for the United States.5 At Enron Corporation, executives
tolerated and committed pervasive acts of fraud that lost billions of
dollars for shareholders.6 Observers wondered how individuals in
these cases had gone so far wrong. In fact, the questions raised by
the Los Angeles experience are raised by countless other events in
which ordinary people, who otherwise seem unlikely to become
criminals, do in fact engage in criminal activity. More than that:
ordinary people, when influenced by groups, sometimes engage in
repeated and open crimes and have seemingly lost their moral
compass.
This Article attempts to illuminate the social psychology that
explains and predicts these occurrences. Specifically, the Article
investigates cognitive dissonance, group effects, conformity,
authority, persuasion, and entrapment in escalation, in an effort to
explain how a person can “succumb to the seductress” in the ways
that Rafael Perez and his fellow LAPD officers did in 2000. Social
science, it must be said at the beginning, is an inexact science, unlike
physics.7 It provides only examples from experiments—only partial
theories—which require so much extrapolation that certainty is often
difficult.
This Article does not deal with evil that is propagated by persons
with mental disorders, such as those with antisocial personalities,8
and it does not explain solitary individuals whose conduct is
motivated by financial gain or by personal desires, such as burglars or
violent predators. Instead, it concentrates on the individual whose
place within an organization, or whose relation to a group, is part of

5. See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL 18 (2007) (containing social psychologist Philip Zimbardo’s analysis of
events at Abu Ghraib); see also Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Graib, NEW YORKER, May
10, 2004, at 42–47 (containing a literary, quasi-journalistic account).
6. Bethany McLean et al., Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58–68.
7. For a discussion of the limits of the scientific method in psychology, see DAVID
CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 351–54 (2001).
8. For a discussion of these issues, see id. at 358, 360.
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the influence toward crime: in other words, on the situation in which
good people are influenced toward evil by their peers and leaders.
The Article applies the lessons of social science to the law by
analyzing the kinds of prohibitions, prescriptions, or incentives that
might be most effective to avoid antisocial behavior in given
situations. A final section provides the author’s conclusions
concerning potential responses to these situations, which include the
insight that when we write legal standards that affect individuals
within groups, it is important to write them so that they can be
enforced not just when evil already is widespread, but continuously
and proactively as well.
II. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND RELATED PHENOMENA9
A. Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance is one of the more
important developments in social psychology. Stated in ordinary
language, it explains how people “rationalize” bad behavior.10 Leon
Festinger theorized that there is a mental tension created by
contradictory perceptions, which he called “cognitive dissonance.”11
The theory can be summarized by saying that “behavior determines
attitudes, as well as the other way around,”12 because individuals are
motivated to reduce the tension (or dissonance) by modifying their
attitudes to fit their perceptions of their own behavior. The mind, in
other words, rationalizes bad behavior—or justifies it—by changing
the actor’s cognition (the attitude that conflicts with it), to make bad
behavior seem not so bad. But this neutral explanation understates
the scary side of Festinger’s great insight. To put it more plainly, the
theory predicts that people who commit acts that other people
would unhesitatingly label as evil will come to view those acts as
9. Substantial portions of this section, as well as the table in Section III, appeared in
DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (2001), and are reprinted here with permission.
10. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)
(setting out the theory in detail); Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, SCI. AM., Oct. 1962,
at 93, 93–102 (same).
11. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 377–78; see ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (2005); ROBERT A. BARON & DONN BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 144–53
(9th ed. 2000); THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 309–11 (2006); see also
supra note 10.
12. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 377.
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good, or at least as not so evil. And they will do so because this
attitudinal change makes their minds feel more comfortable or less
dissonant.
The implications of Festinger’s theory are wide-ranging, and
observed effects from varied settings support it. “For example, a
subject who has been made to harm another person with electric
shocks during an experiment tends to begin disparaging the
victim.”13 This attitude reduces the dissonance. Prisoners who
initially despise “snitches” tend to see crime prevention as noble after
they have begun to collaborate with prison authorities.14 As another
example, game theorists have noted that subjects induced to bid in
auctions tend to value the prize more if they have invested heavily in
it.15 Even such mundane experiences as a long wait at a bus stop can
be analyzed in dissonance terms. The theory predicts, ironically, that
the longer one has waited, the more one is motivated to justify the
delay, or even to wait longer, to reduce the tension between a
perception that one has invested in waiting and the attitude that the
investment is not worthwhile. Then, there is the recognized fact that
during voir dire in lawsuits, examining jurors about their attitudes is
difficult. “Does anyone in this jury panel have any ‘prejudices’? Any
‘preconceived notions’ about the issues in this case?” Every member
of a jury panel has preconceived notions, and arguably, everyone has
prejudices. Cognitive dissonance, however, prevents most people
from admitting them, because it prevents them from recognizing
their prejudices.16
B. Zimbardo’s Prison Simulation: Role-Playing and the Dissonance
Phenomenon
Psychologist Phillip Zimbardo designed an experiment related to
dissonance theory that produced disturbing results. He designated
randomly chosen students as “guards,” provided them with
paraphernalia such as uniforms and badges, and gave them a set of

13. Id. at 378; see also ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 416–18 (explaining the
blaming-the-victim phenomenon).
14. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 378.
15. See infra notes 24–33 and accompanying text (evaluating the entrapment-inescalation phenomenon).
16. KENNY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND CLINICAL SKILLS: IN A NUTSHELL 194 (4th ed.
2005) (“You cannot inquire directly, as very few believe themselves prejudiced.”).
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“rules” to enforce. He assigned other students to play the parts of
“prisoners,” restricted to cell-like spaces and wearing jail clothing.17
After an initial tentativeness, both groups began to behave as if
the simulation were real. “Guards” imposed increasingly degrading
punishments upon “prisoners,” who rebelled or passively endured.18
Zimbardo actually found it necessary to terminate the experiment
prematurely.19 Role-playing, it appears, tends to induce attitudes that
conform to the role. The “guards” tended to evaluate the
importance of the “rules” and to disparage reactions of prisoners
when the guards administered punishment for perceived infractions.
Dissonance theory may explain the reason. The guards changed
their attitudes to fit the role they had assumed, and they revised their
thinking about student “prisoners” to justify their oppressive
behavior.20 Zimbardo’s experiment illustrates the dark side of
Festinger’s predictions. And since the “guards” and “prisoners” had
originated as ordinary students randomly selected for the role, the
experiment also shows the power of the dissonance phenomenon.
Ordinary people, having no particular inclination toward evil, will
engage in evil behavior if the alignment of their behavior and their
self-perceptions induces them. By implication, prevention of evil
conduct requires affirmative intervention, rather than assumptions
about the good that there is in people. Enforcement needs to be
proactive.
C. Small Steps: How Cognitive Dissonance Works to Induce Behavior
Gradually
In a way, the picture is even gloomier than this description of
Zimbardo’s experiment suggests. Observation confirms that it is
easier to induce individuals to shift attitudes if they already have
taken steps in the desired direction. Jonathan Freedman and Scott
Frazer conducted an experiment that involved asking a control group
of homeowners to post large, ugly signs saying “Drive Carefully.”21
17. See generally ZIMBARDO, supra note 5.
18. Id. at 73, 106, 119–20, 122, 172, 175; see also ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at
285–87 (discussing Zimbardo’s experiment and its meaning); GILOVICH ET AL., supra note
11, at 4–14 (same).
19. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 174–94.
20. Id. at 219–20.
21. Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-inthe-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 195–202 (1966).
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Fewer than twenty percent consented. At the same time, a second
group of homeowners were asked to display a tiny, three-inch card,
and many agreed. A few days later, the second group of homeowners
who had accepted the tiny sign were asked to accept the big, ugly
sign. This time, nearly eighty percent agreed. “Small steps”—the
second group’s earlier acceptance of the tiny cards—had changed
their attitudes toward the big signs. The experimenters described the
phenomenon as “the foot-in-the-door” technique.22
As another example, political regimes that use torture would be
able to recruit torturers by small steps: first, by having newcomers
stand guard, then by having them observe, and then by inducing
minor participation.23 Perhaps cognitive dissonance, in part, explains
why this “small steps” technique works. Having accepted and
become a part of the behavior, the subject adjusts cognition
(attitudes) to justify the behavior, even when it consists as yet only of
small steps.
D. Entrapment in Escalation: From the Dollar Auction to the
Concorde Fallacy
The phenomenon known as “entrapment in escalation” is
illustrated by experiments based upon the “dollar auction.” In the
dollar auction, an auctioneer announces that he will exchange a one
dollar bill for a payment from the highest bidder. The catch is that
the next-highest bidder also must pay his or her bid.24 Therefore, as
the bidding closes in on a dollar, players scramble to avoid becoming
the next-highest bidder, a phenomenon that often sends the bids up
to amounts exceeding one dollar. Thus, there are three crucial
junctures in the dollar auction: the second bid (which means that
there now is going to be a loser), the first bid over fifty cents (which
means that the auctioneer will profit from the players), and of
course, the “magic moment” (the first bid that exceeds one dollar).25

22. Id.; see also BARON & BYRNE, supra note 11, at 389; GILOVICH ET AL., supra note
11, at 244–45.
23. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 382. It should be added that the small steps phenomenon
can be used to induce good behavior as well as bad behavior. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at
450.
24. Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior
and Escalation, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 109, 109–11 (1971).
25. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 477–78.
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The dollar auction models a number of real-world events. One
example, the “Concorde Fallacy,” as it is called, takes its name from
the supersonic airliner produced by a British-French consortium, for
which costs escalated.26 Even after it was apparent to an objective
observer that the economically sound strategy was to cut and run,
both governments increased their levels of commitment because they
had “too much invested to quit.”27 The Concorde Fallacy mirrors
the dollar auction because a similar psychological trap has been
observed in dollar auction experiments, with astonishing results.
Experimenters typically give subjects sums ranging from $2.50 to
$20 to bid, and often the escalation continues until players have
exhausted all of their funds. In some experiments, the subjects have
become distraught to the point of crying, even as they continue to
bid and run out their money. This “entrapment” phenomenon
occurs in high percentages of experiments.28
Why does it happen? One group of experiments surveyed
subjects during dollar-auction play and concluded that a change in
motivation develops.29 The initial economic motivation, which is to
have a good time by trying to obtain something for less than its
value, gives way to a competitive urge that obscures the player’s
initial goals. Another group of experimenters tied the motive to facesaving.30
In addition to the dollar auction and the Concorde Fallacy, there
are many examples of entrapment in escalation. Consider the
uneconomical, yet unresolvable lawsuit or dispute. It sometimes
occurs that parties to a lawsuit spend more in pretrial preparation
than the amount at issue and still find themselves unable to settle
their dispute short of a trial that will more than double the
expenditures of each. Likewise, it sometimes happens that lawyers
representing labor and management are unable to end a strike that
has produced losses far exceeding any possible gains. The arms race
26. See Hal. R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans
Less Rational Than Lower Animals?, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 591 (1999).
27. ALLAN I. TEGER, TOO MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT 1 (1980) (explaining the
phenomenon in these terms).
28. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 478 (explaining the entrapment).
29. TEGER, supra note 27, at 15–17, 91.
30. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 479. They also produced evidence tending to demonstrate
that men are more susceptible to entrapment in escalation than women. But neither gender
should claim superiority, because experiments with other games show men acting less
aggressively and more cooperatively than women. Id.
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between the United States and the former Soviet Union has often
been similarly analyzed by game theorists.31
It is not difficult to relate the entrapment-in-escalation
phenomenon to the outgrowth of widespread police corruption in
Los Angeles. As Officer Raphael Perez testified, “The ‘us against
them’ ethos of the overzealous cop began to consume me.”32 After
beginning with small steps, Officer Perez may have found himself
trapped in an escalating pattern of repeated crimes.33
E. Implications of Dissonance-Related Phenomena for the Law
Unfortunately, theories and experiments do not always hold clear
implications for behavior modification, and in this area we encounter
a need for speculation. Psychology is not an exact science, like some
areas in physics, and the conclusions that follow are imperfect.
Human beings are complicated. They differ markedly from
individual to individual and group to group. Nevertheless, some
conclusions can be stated with confidence, even if others cannot.
Observations related to cognitive dissonance confirm that it is a
dangerous phenomenon. As the Romans put it, “facilis descensus
Avernum”—roughly translated, “the descent to Hell is easy”—and
the truth of this saying is experimentally verifiable in the examples
discussed above.34 The question that people naturally asked about
the crimes within the LAPD, or at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, should
be stood on its head. The sensible question is not, “How could these
things happen?” Instead, it is: “It’s going to happen!” Given
cognitive dissonance phenomena, Zimbardo’s experiment, and the
small steps observation, shouldn’t we, rather, expect these kinds of
bad behavior to occur, in the absence of strong measures to prevent
them?35
Social psychology tells us that small steps are important here:
social psychology tells us to expect them.36 A police officer in the

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 479.
Glover & Lait, supra note 1, at A2.
See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
Such as Zimbardo’s prison experiment. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying

text.
35. In fact, Zimbardo and others have applied his experimental findings to the analysis
of the Abu Ghraib misconduct. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 324–79; GILOVICH ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 3–5.
36. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
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Ramparts Division of LAPD may have started the process by
observing and tolerating a cover-up in a minor aspect of a police
report, and then by writing false reports himself. An accountant at
Enron may have approved a trader’s claimed hedge strategy that
posed a small risk of being self-funded, and then may have graduated
to bigger prevarications. A National Guardsman at Abu Ghraib may
have begun the descent toward major abuses by participating in a
slight humiliation of a prisoner. The theory of cognitive dissonance
predicts the effect of these actions.37 Attitudes change. The police
officer sees the false report as a necessary law enforcement tool, the
Enron accountant perceives his manipulations as the proper response
to a novel situation in which normal rules (for example, Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles) do not apply to the cutting-edge
transactions of a spectacularly innovative company, and the
guardsman at Abu Ghraib imagines himself to be performing an
essential part in prisoner interrogation, rather than committing a war
crime. Finally, the entrapment-in-escalation phenomenon and
Zimbardo’s prison experiment show that once the police officer,
accountant, or soldier takes on his or her respective role, the role
tends to take on a life of its own—and to make a good person’s
commitment to bad behaviors more pervasive.38
These conclusions suggest that lawmakers must adopt special
measures if they are to counteract bad behavior induced by
dissonance-related phenomena. Lawmakers must call for proactive
enforcement. Rules designed to “nip abuses in the bud” may be
especially effective. At Abu Ghraib, the sudden placement of soldiers
into a hastily organized prison, headed by officers with no relevant
experience, was a predictable disaster.39 Instead of inducing
professional behavior through good-hearted people, the Government
established an environment that fostered mistreatment. If lawmakers
are to prevent this kind of behavior, they must establish clear norms,
ensure that they are enforceable, and immediately condemn even
small variations from them. The Government should hold superior
officers responsible for this policy, as the Army in fact finally did with

37. See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 17–20, 24–33 and accompanying text.
39. See generally supra note 35 and authority therein cited.
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respect to Abu Ghraib—although too late for prevention, at least this
time.40
Along the same lines, Congress reacted to major corporate
financial scandals by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,41
which holds high-level executives liable for the enforcement of
accounting policies through certification requirements.42 Critics have
suggested that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes enormous financial costs,
which may be far out of proportion to its contribution to market
integrity.43 That may be so, particularly with respect to some
provisions. An evaluation of the financial costs imposed by SarbanesOxley is beyond the scope of this Article, but undoubtedly the
burden on particular executives, individual companies, and the
economy as a whole is staggering. However, cognitive dissonance
theory suggests that some of the measures contained in SarbanesOxley are appropriately targeted. Likewise, perhaps the “broken
windows” theory advanced by James Q. Wilson (and used apparently
to such positive effect in New York City while Rudolph Giuliani was
mayor) can be justified by these considerations. The broken windows
theory asserts that intolerance of small crimes, such as aggressive
panhandling, minor drug dealing, and vandalism, also prevents major
crimes, such as rapes, robberies, or murders.44 Again, it is a matter of
preventing small steps!

40. Brigadier General Janis Karpinsky was relieved of command of the 800th Military
Police Brigade and demoted to colonel. Also, Colonel Thomas Pappas was relieved of
command of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and reprimanded. Robert Burns, Colonel
Loses Command in Abuse Scandal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 13, 2005, at A4.
41. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
various sections of Title 15 of the United States Code).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Gary M. Brown, Approaching Securities Laws, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 17, 17–18 (2007) (describing the Act as
“dominat[ing]” corporate practice and as “sweeping”).
44. The thesis appears to have originated in James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling,
Broken Windows, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. For discussion, see Robert C. Ellickson,
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space
Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171, 1182 (1996) (explaining the thesis). But see Bernard E.
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City
Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 314–16 (2006) (concluding that there is no
empirical evidence that proves that police action against minor crime reduces major crime).
For a discussion of how the broken windows theory fits the reduction of environmental
pollution, see ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 519–21 (suggesting that people are more
likely to litter if the environment is already full of litter).
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III. PERSUASION TOWARD WRONGDOING
In addition to cognitive dissonance effects, persuasion and
authority within group settings can motivate people to adopt
behaviors they would not otherwise consider. “Persuasion” includes
a wide variety of mechanisms that supply human motivation.
Persuasion need not be either overt or direct. In fact, it can be
extraordinarily indirect. To put the issue another way, if a LAPD
veteran had attempted to persuade Officer Perez to engage in his
crimes by saying, “The objective is to perjure yourself,” this method
of persuasion would likely be ineffective to a new recruit. But there
are other mechanisms of persuasion.
A. Conformity and Group Influences: Asch’s Experiments
Solomon Asch’s conformity studies are classic in the social
psychology of persuasion. They have disheartening implications for
our hopes about independent thinking or for resistance to group
lawbreaking. Asch used a diagram with a test line and three
comparison lines of differing lengths. He showed them to a group of
stooges and to an experimental subject. See Figure 1.

Thus, he was able to test suggestibility toward conformity from
group influence.45
After the stooges each identified one of the comparison lines,
which obviously did not fit, as matching the test line, Asch invited
the experimental subject’s response. In other words, two or three

45. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 451–95 (1987); Solomon E. Asch,
Opinions and Social Pressure, SCI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31–33.

1452

CRUMP.FIN

1441]

11/24/2008 8:36 PM

The Social Psychology of Evil

stooges first would identify line 1 (or line 3) as matching the test line
in Figure 1, even though the mismatch is obvious. Then, the
experimenter would ask the unsuspecting subject which line was the
best fit. While subjects in the control groups erred less than one
percent of the time,46 Asch noted that “[s]eventy five percent of
experimental subjects agree[d] with the majority in varying
degrees.”47 Subjects often reacted to the stooges’ choices with
astonished looks and puzzled squinting. Asch’s conclusion was that
“the tendency to conformity in our society [is] so strong that
reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to
call white black.”48
In groups, “norms” arise, and they give rise to what is called the
“normative group influence,” a pressure toward conformity, as
opposed to the “informational group influence,” by which a group
can take advantage of the notion that “many heads are better than
one.”49 A norm is an accepted rule for proper social behavior. The
normative influence of a group is its suggestion of conformity (which
may be good, as in the case of positive examples such as group
courtesies, or bad, as Asch’s experiment shows). The informational
group influence, on the other hand, reflects the greater experience or
knowledge of several people rather than one.
Imagine, for example, that a group is asked, “What foreign
country do you first enter if you start at the center of Detroit and
travel due south?” When one member of the group persuades the
others that the answer is Canada because the waterway separating
that country from the United States makes a reverse S shape
immediately below Detroit, the informational influence is at work.
But if a member of the group who knew the correct answer
(Canada) were to adopt an erroneous answer (Mexico) because all
other group members chose that response, the normative group
influence would have won out.50

46. Asch, supra note 45, at 33.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 34; see also ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 256–57 (discussing how the
one person who does not go along with the majority may face consequences); BARON &
BYRNE, supra note 11, at 358–86 (discussing Asch’s work); GILOVICH ET AL., supra note 11,
at 220–31 (same).
49. See CRUMP, supra note 7, at 384–85.
50. Id. at 385.
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There are factors that increase conformity to suggestion, as well
as factors that decrease it.51 Subsequent experiments have shown that
conformity to group suggestion is stronger if a sense of inferiority or
insecurity is induced in the subject. The absence of prior
commitment against the suggestion, as well as membership in a
culture that values conformity, also are strengthening factors.
Unanimity of the group makes for more powerful suggestion than if
the subject has an agreeing companion, and so does a high-status
group, or a group with expertise. Group size also matters, but the
effect seems to level off at a size ranging from three to seven,
depending on the experiment. And, of course, ambiguity of the
correct response increases conformity.52
In the Ramparts Division of the LAPD, the normative group
influence and the conformity phenomenon seem likely to have been
factors in persuading officers to engage in lawbreaking. A new officer
probably has a sense of inferiority or insecurity, perhaps even physical
insecurity. He or she becomes a member of a culture that values
conformity, and the veteran officers presumably are a high-status
group, as well as a group with expertise. The new officer finds
himself or herself in conditions in which by-the-book methods often
do not produce results and often are not the accepted practice, so
that the new officer finds ambiguity in making correct decisions.53 Of
course, there also are factors to the contrary. Most recruits
presumably come in with a prior commitment to follow the law and
avoid perjury. Also, it seems probable that there is a lack of
unanimity among the group of lawbreakers (because surely some
officers at times act with propriety, and thus they provide a
counterexample). But Asch’s experiment shows that the influence
toward conformity is powerful. Similarly, the guardsman-turnedjailer at Abu Ghraib prison seems vulnerable to group influences,54
and so does the neophyte accountant surrounded by lawbreaking at a
place like Enron.

51. Id. at 386.
52. Id.
53. Cf. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 516 (2004) (analyzing how formal training is “quickly undermined” by
contradictory messages in the field).
54. Cf. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 263–65 (discussing Asch’s work in the context of
Zimbardo’s prison experiment).
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Asch’s conformity experiments may explain why states that allow
juries to return non-unanimous jury verdicts in civil cases do not
limit them to eleven-to-one votes. More commonly, verdicts of ten
to two, nine to three, or even eight to four, can support a
judgment.55 When the votes are eleven to one, the conformity
influence is at its most powerful, and social science predicts that a
unanimous verdict is likely anyway. A law allowing eleven-to-one
verdicts would not affect many cases. But if there are two or three
holdouts, each serves to provide a role model to the other that
undermines the unanimity of the group suggestion, and a hung jury
is much more likely. If the jurisdiction really wants to minimize hung
juries, it needs to allow nine-to-three or ten-to-two verdicts, and not
just eleven-to-one verdicts.
B. Authority as a Factor in Persuasion
Conformity is not the only mechanism of group suggestion.
Authority is another. And, while the findings about conformity
discussed above are cause for concern, the results of experiments
with authority are even more so. They are downright scary.
Stanley Milgram’s authority experiments are a landmark
example.56 Milgram set up a phony “experimenter” in an officiallooking white lab coat, who actually was a stooge, and who
instructed subjects to administer electrical “shocks” to a strappeddown “learner” whenever the learner made errors.57 The scale for the
“shocks” began at “15 volts (‘Slight’ Shock),” and went through
“150 volts (‘Strong’ Shock),” all the way to 450 volts.58 But in
reality there were no shocks, and the learner also was a stooge who
both erred intentionally and grunted or gasped in pain at the lower

55. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revising the Unanimity Requirement: The
Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) (“[O]nly
eighteen states require unanimity and another three accept a non-unanimous verdict after six
hours of deliberation. The remaining states permit super-majorities of between two-thirds and
five-sixths in civil cases.” (internal citation omitted)).
56. Milgram was Asch’s student and was familiar with Asch’s conformity experiments.
He got the idea for his own studies by considering Asch’s work but shifted his thinking to a
focus on experimental control rather than group control. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 266.
For Zimbardo’s discussion of Milgram’s work, see id. at 266–272. See also ARONSON ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 519–21 (discussing Milgram’s work); BARON & BYRNE, supra note 11, at
272–79; GILOVICH ET AL., supra note 11, at 10–11.
57. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 268–69.
58. See id. at 269.
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settings.59 At 120 volts, the stooge playing the part of the learner
protested that the shocks were painful; at 150 the stooge (through a
voice recorder) shouted that he wanted “to be released from the
experiment, complaining of a heart disturbance.”60
If the subject faltered, the experimenter responded firmly that
“the experiment requires that you go on.”61 At “180 volts,” the
learner shouted that he “couldn’t stand” the pain;62 at 300,
responses stopped, and the experimenter told the subject to treat a
non-response as a wrong answer.63 Most subjects who “prematurely”
terminated this charade were highly agitated, and so were those who
continued, protesting all the way, to 450 volts.64 The white-jacketed
“experimenter” used the same simple technique every time a subject
hesitated, telling the subject that “the experiment requires you to
continue” or words to that effect.65
Astonishingly, more than sixty percent of the subjects continued
to the end of the scale while hearing agonized cries from the
stooge.66 Milgram’s conclusion was that “ordinary people” were
sufficiently obedient to purported authority that they could readily
be engaged in a “terribly destructive process.”67 It does not take
much extrapolation to infer that some people can similarly be
influenced to violate the law, even when harmful results are clear.
What kinds of circumstances strengthen or reduce the effect of
authority? Later experiments showed that a high-status authority
tended to increase obedience. If the phony “experimenter” was
introduced as a professor from a prestigious university, for example,
subjects obeyed more readily than if the “experimenter” claimed
affiliation with a lesser university. The presence of a disobeying role
model reduced obedience. Physical factors, such as close proximity of
the authority giving instructions or distance of the person harmed
59. Id. at 270.
60. Stanley Milgram, Group Pressure and Action Against a Person, 69 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 139 (1964) [hereinafter Milgram, Group Pressure]; see also Stanley
Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963)
[hereinafter Milgram, Obedience].
61. Milgram, Obedience, supra note 60, at 374.
62. Milgram, Group Pressure, supra note 60, at 139.
63. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 268–69.
64. See id.
65. Milgram, Obedience, supra note 60, at 374; see also authorities cited supra note 56.
66. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 271.
67. See authorities cited supra note 56.
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(for example, by walling the “learner” off in another room),
reinforced obedience. More recent experiments have shown that
depersonalization of the experimental subject, such as the wearing of
a mask, makes the subject more obedient to either group conformity
or to authority suggestions that might otherwise be resisted.68
These experimental results suggest a reason why the so-called
Nuremberg Defense,69 offered by an actor whose crime is alleged to
have occurred during the execution of a military order, is properly
viewed by courts with suspicion. Specifically, the experiments
indicate that resistance to authority should be encouraged when the
objective is transparently illegal because authority is a more powerful
motivator toward harmful action than one might have supposed.
Thus, although the Model Penal Code provides an affirmative
defense for a military actor who “execute[s] an order,” the defense
applies only if the actor “does not know [the order] to be
unlawful.”70 The inapplicability of the defense to orders known to be
illegal may seem a minimal concession at first glance, but it actually is
strong medicine. It requires soldiers to disobey rules about the chain
of command that have been drilled forcefully into them, even
though they may face severe consequences from their rectitude.
Milgram’s experiments show the necessity for such a limit upon the
defense.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF ENFORCEMENT
Social psychology leads to a wide variety of conclusions, most of
which must be regarded as tentative. The clearest conclusion,
probably, is that enforceability of legal norms, as well as actual
enforcement, is important. Inclinations toward bad behavior within
groups are surprisingly strong. The dissonance phenomenon,
particularly when actors take on roles, induces overreaction. The
small-steps phenomenon, authority response, and conformity
influence show that minor and occasional violation easily can expand

68. See CRUMP, supra note 7, at 386.
69. So called because lower-ranking officials offered it at war crimes trials held in
Nuremberg, Germany after World War II. This defense is the claim that a soldier was following
orders, and thus cannot be held culpable for the violation of any laws those actions may have
violated. See Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335,
340 (2002).
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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to become pervasive. Continuous correction of this tendency is
needed.
A. Bottom-Up Enforcement and Top-Down Enforcement
All of these considerations suggest that visible, responsive, and
constant enforcement of pre-set norms is more important than one
might think to prevent bad behavior from growing within a group.
Without enforcement, conduct that reasonable people recognize as
not just unacceptable, but as obviously and seriously unacceptable,
should nevertheless be expected to emerge because the social
psychology amply shows how human beings will redefine bad
conduct so that it becomes acceptable—and will propagate it
through their peers and underlings.71 Bottom-up enforcement of
group norms can take the form of conformity to group suggestion
that counteracts potentially immoral orders from the top.72 Topdown enforcement also plays an important role because it takes
advantage of the authority phenomenon and counteracts the
emergence of antisocial authority (rogue managers) as well as peers
who influence others toward misconduct.73 Several kinds of
conclusions about enforcement can be drawn from these statements.
For example, large organizations that are well managed for
compliance usually devise built-in enforcement methods when they
contemplate their responses to new regulatory standards.74 Consider
a chemical facility that must comply with clean air standards. The
standards themselves often do not express any enforcement
mechanism, and for that matter, they usually do not contain any
algorithm for compliance.75 A team of compliance specialists,

71. The similarity between events at Abu Ghraib and Zimbardo’s prison experiment is a
striking example. See supra notes 17–20, 34 and accompanying text. Milgram’s results are even
more striking. See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.
72. Originally, the “human relations” movement, and later, “organizational theory,”
emphasized the importance of the difference between rules and informal norms in
management. See CRUMP, supra note 7, at 178.
73. Top-down management, often referred to as “administrative management,” is a part
of classical theory that emphasized the integrity of the chain of command. See CRUMP, supra
note 7, at 176–77 (discussing the “Fourteen Principles” of Management set out by Henry
Fayol).
74. Interview with John J. Crump, former compliance engineer, Shell Chem. Corp., in
Houston, Tx. (Nov. 14, 2007).
75. See, e.g., Rules and Regulations of the EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 63 (2007) (setting national
standards for certain air pollutants; in 72 FR 38864-01).
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separate from the employees who will actually carry out compliance
duties, will be charged with responsibility for designing a checklist
for the completion of those duties.76 The checklist will detail each
individual step specified. Perhaps most importantly, it will include a
mechanism by which enforcement is automatic. The chemically
reactive column that the compliance employee is charged with
maintaining will not function unless a particular switch is thrown,
and the switch is installed so that it cannot be thrown unless the
employee has performed all of the required steps.77
This kind of mechanical solution is not always possible, but if
not, the organization can promulgate rules that come close. The
relatively simple solution of having a written checklist that must be
signed by a supervisor, before the employee can consider the job
complete, is an example. These kinds of processes are not fail-safe.
Employees learn how to fool the compliance switch, and supervisors
become lax about ensuring that the checklist that they sign has
indeed been completed. The presence of enforcement mechanisms,
however, would do some good in overcoming influences toward bad
behavior, and it makes the detection of widespread abuses more
likely.
There are some kinds of policies that should be implemented
from the top down. The company’s sexual harassment policy is an
example. Human relations advice indicates that this policy should be
authoritative, clear, and secure.78 Furthermore, checklist and fail-safeswitch approaches are inapplicable to a problem that can assume an
infinite variety of forms and for which communication and example
are essential. Thus, the harassment policy should call for ready
communication with managers—one’s immediate manager first, but
with the option of climbing the entire chain if communication is
unworkable with the immediate superior. Here, top-down
enforcement means that the positive influence of authority, the
factor that proved so powerfully negative in Milgram’s experiments,79
will provide a check against the influence of cognitive dissonance,

76. Interview with John J. Crump, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. See Linda Ottinger Headley & Katherine E. Flanagan, Harassment, Sexual and
Otherwise, in UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW FOUNDATION, ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW
FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS 50–53 (2006).
79. See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.
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small steps, conformity, and other factors that can create bottom-up
harassment.80
B. Designing Avenues for Automatic Enforcement at the Time
Regulations Are Promulgated
In order to be effective, measures aimed at preventing the spread
of bad behavior must be enforceable. It is perfectly possible to design
legislation that is impossible to enforce. For example, consider the
city that wrote its prohibition of farm and exotic animals so that it
defined a misdemeanor that did not apply to anyone “in the business
of keeping animals.”81 The local district attorney found it necessary
to decline enforcement of this provision.82 Even if an individual
maintained a herd of goats beside his or her patio home, no
prosecutor could prove that the individual was not “in the business
of keeping animals.”83 Since the prohibition was unenforceable,
residents who wanted to keep pigs or goats would probably do so.
They might begin with small steps—one pig or goat—and begin to
see themselves as freedom fighters against the totalitarian city. Then,
the conformity urge probably would ensure that others imitated the
behavior.
The city could have produced a result closer to the one it desired
by thinking of enforceability. One simple way to solve its problem
would have been to provide that the “business of keeping animals”
was not an element of the offense that the prosecution needed to
negate, but rather an affirmative defense upon which the goat herd
would have both the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion.84 This approach might not furnish the best solution,
but it would have enabled the district attorney in the situation
described above to initiate misdemeanor cases rather than declining
prosecution. A better solution, perhaps, would have been to set up a

80. Social psychological experiments show that this kind of accountability and
responsibility is effective. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 255–56 (discussing the
experiments).
81. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING
STRATEGIES 117–18 (2005) (paraphrasing such a statute).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 118 (explaining why such a case is not prosecutable, in spite of students’
frequent enthusiasm for creative evidence gathering).
84. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (creating affirmative defenses; providing for
proof by defendant in some cases).
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permit or registration system and to define the misdemeanor as
keeping one or more of the non-urban animals without a permit or
registration.85 This approach would have made enforcement much
easier, although it would not have avoided the need for some court
actions. If even a couple of ersatz freedom fighters ever formed the
impression that enforcement of the law against non-permitted goat
herds was lacking, social psychology suggests that violations would
have crept in and grown.
Sometimes government enforcement is not the only way for a
law to work against cognitively dissonant, small-stepped, conforming
violators. For example, a withholding system makes income taxes
much more readily collectable.86 The employer is virtually required
to function as the analogue of a fail-safe switch by the knowledge
that failure to withhold creates liability.87 The result is widespread (if
not perfect) payment of income taxes by salaried employees. This
factor is built into the Internal Revenue Code for precisely this
reason. A less planned outcome, but a serendipitous one, occurs
when the mortgage banking industry sets up escrows that collect and
pay local property taxes.88 A lender is motivated to enforce
compliance because it can lose its security if a tax-related foreclosure
takes the property from the borrower.
But even if these means of private enforcement are not available,
and a government system is necessary, social psychology strongly
suggests that regulators should build enforcement into their
regulations from the beginning. They should understand the kinds
of algorithms that firms in the regulated industry will need to
promulgate for compliance. In other words, regulators should not
simply create standards and wait for compliance officers in each firm
to invent methods for meeting them; instead, they should have

85. Cf. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §§ 301–309 (1994) (setting up
registration system).
86. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1990) (explaining the withholding system
enacted by Congress).
87. 36 U.S.C. § 3402(d) (2000) (stating that the employee is responsible for the taxes
“but this subsection shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any penalties” for
failing to withhold the taxes).
88. For cases illustrating such a requirement, see In re Ma, 375 B.R. 387, 391 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2007); Fournigault v. Independence One Mortgage Corp., 242 F.R.D. 486 (N.D.
Ill. 2007). See also DAVID CRUMP ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND LAWYERING
STRATEGIES 263, 265–66 (2003) (explaining the requirement; reproducing a mortgage
instrument containing such a requirement).
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concrete awareness that plans for step-by-step, fail-safe enforcement,
or methods that overcome inducements toward noncompliance can
be created. They should adjust the wording of each standard so that
it can be made the subject of an effective algorithm for reliable,
enforceable compliance.
This is not to say that government should mandate any particular
enforcement algorithm that it considers in promulgating its standard.
Often, that approach is inefficient if what is sought is compliance
with a standard. The market may produce better compliance
mechanisms, or it may be best served by different mechanisms in
different situations. The point is only that government should
consider the availability of enforcement algorithms when it designs
its standards. To put the matter another way, if one type of standard
seems attractive in terms of the results it promises but is difficult to
enforce, a standard that produces slightly lesser results but is reliably
enforceable may actually be preferable.
C. Implications of These Conclusions for the Examples That Began This
Article
What would social psychology mean for, say, rules governing
jailers at Abu Ghraib prison—the site of those novice guards’
astounding abuse of inmates, which subjected some of them to later
prosecution and impaired the international reputation of the United
States? Social psychology speaks clearly in at least one respect: the
likelihood of occurrence of this kind of abuse. The probability that
dissonance, role, small steps, and conformity will induce bad
behavior is high, as Zimbardo’s prison experiment shows. The
question is not, “How could such behavior have happened?” but
rather “Shouldn’t we expect it to happen?” And so, the first step in
regulating this kind of bad behavior is to assume that it will happen,
that it will be imitated, and that it will be widespread—unless
managers take serious steps against it. The second step is to set up
regulations that have a meaningful chance of preventing it. And the
third consideration is to think of enforceability—by automatic means
to the extent possible, and by intervention of authority to the extent
needed—and to provide for it.
Enforceability in this case is the hardest issue, as it often is in
many cases. In a situation such as that at Abu Ghraib, one idea that
might make sense is to make sure that the individual acting as
warden has personal responsibility for taking active steps against
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prisoner abuse. The social psychological literature shows without
question that imposing appropriately calibrated responsibility upon
the chief executive invokes the power of authority to bring about
sound results,89 and the chief executive can use more subtle, varied,
and effective methods than the law can.90
The effects of communication, instruction, and example can be
powerful in achieving compliance, as social science shows.91 This
concept seems obvious but is not. The United States Army took
steps to hold the responsible general accountable for Abu Ghraib
after the fact, but by then it was too late for either prevention or
serious enforcement.92 At lower levels, a serious policy regulating bad
behavior by guards would require a report from any individual
having non-routine contact with a prisoner. It would invest middle
managers, from colonels down to sergeants, with personal
responsibility for ensuring that reports of the kind are made—and for
condemning nonconforming conduct. Further, it would contain
policies for dealing with common troublesome incidents, such as the
need to invade a cell to remove a recalcitrant prisoner. This policy
would be based upon awareness of a practical procedure, an
algorithm, so that a team with clear responsibilities could remove the
prisoner with least risk to themselves and with minimal harm to the
prisoner. Similar considerations apply to a police department, such as
the one in Los Angeles that experienced widespread official
misconduct.
These same principles probably apply to the Enron situation. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for all of the criticism that has been leveled at it,
seemed to create the kinds of legal standards that will address Enrontype abuses by making those in authority personally responsible for
financial statements. Such a standard is enforceable. It avoids the
negation of the standard by divided responsibility among executives,
accountants, and lawyers, a division that means none is accountable
because all have deniability of the crucial knowledge. On the other
hand, the criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley may also have merit. Its
sponsors probably should have considered compliance algorithms as

89. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 255–57.
90. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 451–56 (offering “a ten-step program to resist
unwanted influences”).
91. Id. at 456.
92. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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part of their definition of the standard. That approach might have
maximized enforceability while reducing costs. In the end, it may
prove true that Sarbanes-Oxley costs much more than any benefits
that it could ever provide. That is a question for another article.
V. CONCLUSION
In all of these cases, the solutions are similar. The first
consideration is to expect abuses whenever dissonance phenomena,
roles, small steps, and conformity indicate that they are likely. As a
corollary, prevention requires setting aside blind faith that every
individual’s inherent goodness will minimize bad behavior. The
second consideration is to set up regulations that target the expected
behavior. Third, the regulations should be designed with
enforcement in mind. Finally, the necessary level and kind of
enforcement that may be needed should be projected and provided.
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